Ian Ayres and Fredrick Vars have done the gun debate a tremendous service in their new book. They have shown that a range of proposals expected to reduce gun death and injury are plausible in our c...

This article explores how Axel Honneth's critical theory, when adapted to a materialist depth realism, can be utilised as a critique of Fredrick Hayek's ‘neoliberalism’, an antipolitics influenced by Karl Popper's neo‐positivism. In response to the neoliberal challenge, it is proposed that Axel Honneth's theories of recognition, when grounded in anthropological (‘critical’) materialism, provides a robust defence of an irreducible social agency. When interpreted through this lens, recognition is one aspect of the system of human needs based on subject–subject (...) interactions, the other being a subject–object interaction of humans with non‐human objects. By contrast, Honneth's more recent theory of social freedom relies on a Hegelian process of historical reconstruction and so remains vulnerable to the same epistemic errors that inform neoliberal attempts to universalise homo economicus, that is, of reducing reality to various ways in which it is conceptualised. In this regard, anthropological materialism must presuppose depth realism. The importance of this can be seen when the implications for Honneth's move towards a more orthodox Hegelianism in his more recent works are considered. (shrink)

This article explores how Axel Honneth's critical theory, when adapted to a materialist depth realism, can be utilised as a critique of Fredrick Hayek's ‘neoliberalism’, an antipolitics influenced by Karl Popper's neo-positivism. In response to the neoliberal challenge, it is proposed that Axel Honneth's theories of recognition, when grounded in anthropological (‘critical’) materialism, provides a robust defence of an irreducible social agency. When interpreted through this lens, recognition is one aspect of the system of human needs based on subject–subject (...) interactions, the other being a subject–object interaction of humans with non-human objects. By contrast, Honneth's more recent theory of social freedom relies on a Hegelian process of historical reconstruction and so remains vulnerable to the same epistemic errors that inform neoliberal attempts to universalise homo economicus, that is, of reducing reality to various ways in which it is conceptualised. In this regard, anthropological materialism must presuppose depth realism. The importance of this can be seen when the implications for Honneth's move towards a more orthodox Hegelianism in his more recent works are considered. (shrink)

Title: Martin Heidegger's Critique of Freedom Author: Charles Robinson Advisor: Professor Susan Shell Boston College Political Science Department This is a study of thought and politics of Martin Heidegger. It presents an examination of his understanding of freedom, principally as he expressed it in Being and Time, but also considers some of his subsequent essays and lectures, as well as his Rectorate Address. Ever since Heidegger's public embrace of National Socialism, his defenders and critics have argued about the possible (...) relation between his thinking and his infamous political commitments. While many of his critics have linked his commitments to an alleged lack of understanding of freedom, some of his scholarly defenders have sought to present interpretations of his concept of freedom at odds with his infamous politics, in order to separate his thought from any association with Nazism. The conclusions of these critics and defenders of Heidegger are both mistaken: in Being and Time Heidegger sought the meaning of being in the authentic experience of human self-determination revealed by the conscience, which he worked out as "forward running resolve." It was this militant concept of freedom that grounded his project for a destined community of battle to be championed by a free corps of freedom fighters, and led him to embrace, in the very name of freedom, the tyranny of Hitler's new Reich. The study of Heidegger's concept of authentic freedom reveals that, far from lacking any understanding of freedom, it was rather a central theme and concern of his philosophical efforts, and that his infamous political commitments were indeed its necessary and coherent practical consequence. Heidegger's thought thus poses a more trenchant and pressing challenge to liberal (and leftist) politics than many of his critics and defenders appreciate. There have been comparatively few sustained thematic treatments of Heidegger's understanding of freedom in English. This study accordingly hopes to contribute to an understanding of this central theme of Heidegger's philosophical efforts, which not only reveals their necessary connection to his politics, but also promises to improve our access to the coherent intelligibility of his thought as a whole. (shrink)

Distinguished by its readability and scope, Moral Reasons analyzes issues in moral and political philosophy with careful attention to the role of argumentation in the study of ethics. After a comprehensive overview of moral reasoning--including dozens of examples and exercises--Charles K. Fink guides readers through the theories and arguments of philosophers from Plato to Peter Singer, covering such diverse topics as moral skepticism, abortion, euthanasia, political authority, punishment and war. Ideal as a main text for courses on applied ethics (...) or as a supplemental text for courses on social and political philosophy, this book offers one of the most diverse investigations of moral philosophy there is to date. (shrink)

DigiCat Publishing presents to you this special edition of "The Sixth Sense: Its Cultivation and Use" by Charles Henry Brent. DigiCat Publishing considers every written word to be a legacy of humankind. Every DigiCat book has been carefully reproduced for republishing in a new modern format. The books are available in print, as well as ebooks. DigiCat hopes you will treat this work with the acknowledgment and passion it deserves as a classic of world literature.

Positive psychology is about fostering strength and living well-about how to do a good job at being human. Charles Hackney connects this still-new movement to foundational concepts in philosophy and Christian theology. He then explores topics such as subjective states, cognitive processes, and the roles of personality, relationships, and environment.

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 63 Heft: 3 Seiten: 427-447.

First published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First published in 1956, this volume constitutes an attempt to identify the moral basis of Burke's political thought. Given Burke's stated belief that contingent political systems are held together by an essential basis in moral principles, this can be seen as a problem of fundamental importance in gaining an understanding of his theories. The obvious difficulty of such an exposition consists in attempting to create common ground between abstract concepts and the mutability of the empirically observed world. The author meets (...) this difficulty with an approach based upon the subtle analysis of particular aspects in Burke's moral thought as they interact with the world. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in philosophy, political theory, and the development of the British political system. (shrink)

The movement and its members.--H. C. Brokmeyer.--W. T. Harris.--Denton J. Snider.--Bibliography.

(Supplement to Monty Python’s Australian Philosophers ‘Bruce’ Sketch, Occasioned by the large number of Australian philosophers called ‘Karen’) Dramatis Personae: KAREN 1 (Head of Department: rugged and decisive. Farm animals instinctively obey.) KAREN 2 (Hume Studies: tough lady cop from ‘Water Rats’.) KAREN 3 (Wittgenstein and Philosophy of Science: more aggressive – tough lady crime lord from ‘Water Rats’.) KAREN 4 (Practical Reasoning: Put upon - still fairly rugged but it is not an accident that she is the one who (...) often ends up mucking out the stables.) AISLING (Young woman with slight Irish accent tempered by some years at the ANU.). (shrink)

Once, G. E. Moore scorned the “common point of view which takes the world of experience as ultimately real.” The argument Moore followed to this sceptical conclusion in his fledgling 1897 fellowship dissertation was a legacy from Kant's Antinomies. By 1899 Moore had renounced idealist conclusions; he set out both to disengage from Kantian arguments and to reconcile with “the world of experience.” Moore's work for a stable realist basis for knowledge to fulfil both aims occupied his most famous argument, (...) in his 1939 lecture “Proof of an External World.” Moore himself is sometimes supposed to have thought the argument of this masterwork unsatisfactory where it treats a traditional sceptical puzzle posed by dreaming. Critics, including Wittgenstein, have portrayed Moore's best reply to philosophical scepticism as dogmatic mere assertion, unresponsive or as ineffectual as sheer handwaving. However, these critics rate Moore's success against scepticism based on interpretations of “Proof of an External World” that neglect its part in Moore's campaign against Kant. Consequently, some potentially pivotal questions — which in this study I merely broach — remain wide open; for example, why in presenting his famous 1939 proof did Moore state that its purpose was to refute what “Kant declares to be his opinion, that there is only one possible proof of the existence of things outside of us”? And why did Moore explicitly reject the formula for posing philosophical scepticism in which Kant famously proclaimed this problem “a scandal to philosophy”? (shrink)

La collection « Dictionnaire...» a l'ambition de présenter, dans des ouvrages de 200 pages environ, l'essentiel des termes (le mot est volontairement vague) dans lesquels s'exprime chaque philosophe.

La lecture que propose Derrida de Genet, dans Glas, est un exemple particulièrement intéressant de la méthode déconstructive en matière d’interprétation des textes littéraires. Venant à peine plus de vingt ans après le Saint Genet, comédien et martyr de Sartre, le texte de Derrida ne pouvait manquer en effet d’entrer en rivalité avec celui du grand auteur encore vivant à l’époque. Et de fait, Derrida, non seulement ne manque aucune occasion, dans Glas, de souligner les insuffisances et les défauts qu’il (...) relève chez Sartre, mais se trouve en outre conduit, par la nécessité de cette opposition, à caractériser sa propre méthode aussi nettement que possible, jusqu’à souligner, voire accuser, les traits de son projet de lecture. De là, malgré la complication voulue (et parfois indémêlable) du texte, la grande clarté doctrinaire de Glas, et, pour peu qu’on ait la patience de le lire, son fréquent aspect de « manifeste » ou de « défense et illustration » de la déconstruction en littérature. Bien loin de contresigner le pacte d’illisibilité que nous proposerait Glas, je me propose donc, dans les pages qui suivent, d’exposer aussi clairement que possible, en elle-même et par différence d’avec celle de Sartre principalement, cette lecture derridienne de Genet : ses principes, ses résultats, son originalité, mais aussi, comme nous le verrons, certaines ressemblances parfois inattendues avec sa rivale, tenant sans doute (telle sera du moins mon hypothèse finale) à la difficulté même de définir au fond l’intérêt qu’une philosophie (en tant que telle) peut trouver à se confronter à une œuvre littéraire (en tant que telle)… . (shrink)

Les auteurs analysent l'absence du sentiment d'injustice dans la musique populaire, que ce soit dans les chansons traditionnelles, les chansons d'amour, le rap ou encore les chansons politiquement engagées. Electre 2018.

In interviews, it may happen that a respondent gives an answer which seems well formatted, but is not receipted as acceptable by the interviewer. In this article I examine one way in which interviewers display their diagnosis of the problem and act to bring about its solution. In the cases I describe, the interviewers defer revision of the question until they have established a new, more personalized basis for it, informed by their knowledge of the respondents' circumstances. There are three (...) things of interest. The first is how this actually works conversationally; it seems to be structured as an insertion sequence and played out by presequential turns which are highly projective of the respondent's agreement. The second is that the scenario that the interviewer inserts is a positive example of what would have been an answer to the `failed' original question. The third is that there is a difference between the original, general question and its subsequent, specific revision. I argue that all these features manifest interviewers' solution of their dilemma in choosing between literal and sensitive questioning. (shrink)

This paper is a criticism of Plantinga’s analysis of a version of the ontological argument. He thinks it is obvious that his version is valid and that the only question of interest is whether a key premise is true. The paper lays out two relevant semantical accounts of modal logic. It contends that Plantinga needs to show that one is preferable to the other.

Mark Steiner criticizes some remarks Wittgenstein makes about Gödel. Steiner takes Wittgenstein to be disputing a mathematical result. The paper argues that Wittgenstein does no such thing. The contrast between the realist and the demonstrativist concerning mathematical truth is examined. Wittgenstein is held to side with neither camp. Rather, his point is that a realist argument is inconclusive.